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COMMUNICATIONS 
TO THE EDITOR: 
On the Rogow principle (APSR [September 
1974], p. 1281) two corrections, one on that very 
page of importance, the other on p. 1001. Does 
Mr. Miller (p. 1001) have any evidence that fans 
"became disinterested in baseball because of lack 
of speed'? Nonfans may not have been attracted 
for that reason, but in good sports towns like 
Boston and Detroit, has there been disenchant- 
ment? One doubts it! The editor should have 
picked that up. 
More seriously, the reference to Einstein on 
p. 1281 is quite misleading; I don't know whether 
the journal in which Einstein's article appeared 
had referees, but David Lindsay Watson (Scien- 
tists Are Human [London, Watts & Co., 1938]) 
shows us the theoretical reasons for the exten- 
sively documented fact that it can confidently be 
anticipated that most referees will not evaluate 
most unconventional articles "on their merits." 
Watson leads us to think that in science Admiral 
Lord Fisher's aphorism "favoritism is the secret of 
effectiveness," applies. Innovative work, for rea- 
sons also developed by R. T. LaPiere (Social 
Change [New York: McGraw Hill, 1965]) is 
pretty sure, generally speaking, to be turned down 
by established, conventional referees. It is handi- 
capped not only by its intrinsic unconventionality 
but by the generally relevant circumstance that 
most original and innovative writers are "imper- 
fectly socialized" in a profession, and so their 
style, approach, citations, etc., are ordinarily 
likely to offend the better established members of 
that profession. In other words, the implication of 
what I am saying is that no unconventional 
writer can get judgment on the merits by normal 
methods of referee selection-Einsteins would 
hardly ever get by, and even writers who are 
merely six years ahead or a generation behind the 
times will have it tough. Look at the experience of 
Semmelweiss, Lister, Lobachevski, or Riemann 
in the "hard" sciences for pertinent cases-or 
early reviews of Lasswell or of the later work of 
Arthur F. Bentley in this journal. 
Fortunately, in a society like ours, with plenty 
of outlets some fortunate concatenation of cir- 
cumstances may ultimately get two or three ref- 
erees who will take risks; or with good luck one 
can get favoritism on merit. This takes persistence, 
however, which many original people do not 
have; and this letter is simply a suggestion to 
people rudely turned down by referees to keep 
at it. 
My statement is based partly on personal ex- 
perience; I am surely no Einstein or Riemann, 
but I may have been five or six years ahead in cer- 
tain ways. For example, the original version of an 
article of mine called "The Representative and 
His District," when finally published, was re- 
jected by this Review with the friendly comment 
that it was a disgrace to the profession that any- 
one calling himself a political scientist should sub- 
mit such an article! Applied Anthropology (Hu- 
man Organization) later published it, it has been 
reprinted or I have received requests at any rate 
to have it republished about twenty-five times, it 
is one of the better selling Bobbs Merrill reprints, 
it is widely cited. Similarly, an article entitled 
"The Politics and Sociology of Stupidity" was 
rejected by the American Journal of Mental De- 
ficiency with two pages of advice about the serious 
psychiatric condition which the referee felt I must 
suffer from; yet it was published in Social Prob- 
lems, has been widely cited, republished, and, I 
am told, also been influential on several theses 
and studies. 
Of the 80 or so articles I have had published, I 
believe the modal article has experienced at least 
six rejections; several have been rejected at least 
fifteen times (notably "Standards for Representa- 
tive Selection and Apportionment, "Nomos, vol- 
ume on Representation- which has been used by 
several authors in some detail, and assigned in 
quite a number of classes). 
It is important in sociology of knowledge terms 
to indicate that types of articles are pretty sure to 
be rejected, precisely because they are unconven- 
tional, original contributions. For instance, the 
typical academic article nowadays is linear in its 
logic; a implies b, b implies c, d follows from c, 
etc. But some great writers-Kenneth Burke, Ed- 
mund Burke, David Riesman, and, I believe, 
Richard Hooker-follow a different model; they 
walk around a set of problems, as though in a 
circle, looking at the problems now from this 
standpoint, then from that, etc., etc. Such articles 
are pretty sure to be turned down; and, I must 
confess, knowing this, I have weakened some of 
what I have written, by shifting it from that per- 
spective to the linear approach, to seem more 
normal. 
LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER 
Harvard University 
To THE EDITOR: 
In the March 1974 issue of this Review Stephen 
G. Salkever (in his "Virtue, Obligation, and Poli- 
tics," pp. 78-92) asserts that the examination of 
the obligation and virtue conceptions of politics 
"is as important for students of politics and politi- 
cal philosophy as it is for students of ethics and 
moral philosophy" (p. 78). Salkever thereupon 
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begins an impressive classificatory account full of 
historical attributions to the great political phi- 
losophers and supporting citations. His aim is to 
show the prominence that "obligation" and 
"virtue" have had in the history of political 
thought: "virtue' being primarily important in 
ancient political philosophy and "obligation" 
being of essentially modern significance. 
This combination of conceptual analysis, his- 
torical examination, and supporting exegesis is 
standard in contemporary political philosophy. I 
have no objection to this endeavor provided both 
the political philosopher, such as Salkever, and 
his readers are clear on what it actually achieves. 
To mistake preliminary conceptual and historical 
concerns for the main task of political philosophy 
or to consider such preliminaries sufficient by 
themselves is to miss the major point of political 
philosophy: to make prescriptive and evaluative 
political judgments and to justify them ratio- 
nally. 
Salkever begins his discussion by citing several 
articles in contemporary moral philosophy and 
claims to apply the distinction made in that field 
between the ethics of virtue and the ethics of ob- 
ligation as it was made by the moral philosopher 
William K. Frankena (whom Salkever cites on 
p. 78). But Salkever appears to have ignored the 
essential justificatory element of contemporary 
moral philosophy emphasized by Frankena him- 
self in his well-known volume Ethics (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), which surpris- 
ingly is not mentioned by Salkever. In it Frankena 
states that concern over the meaning of terms such 
as "virtue" and "obligation" is subordinate in 
importance, and of instrumental value only, to 
the justification of ethical judgments (see Ethics, 
pp. 78-79). 
We perform conceptual analysis for the purpose 
of clarifying the quintessential problem of norma- 
tive discourse: the justification of our judgments. 
Salkever seems to recognize this point early in his 
discussion when he says that moral philosophers' 
concern for clarifying "virtue" and "obligation" 
"may be able to develop arguments to suggest that 
one or another ethical language is best equipped 
to deal with the broadest range of substantive 
ethical questions" (p. 78, emphasis added). He 
asserts several times throughout the article, how- 
ever, that all he claims is that one concept 
("virtue") be considered as an alternative to the 
allegedly dominant concept ("obligation") in 
modern political philosophy. For example, Sal- 
kever writes: "I am not here concerned to provide 
a conclusive showing of the wrongness of these 
formulations [based on the concept of 'obliga- 
tion'], but only to show why it seems advisable 
to think seriously about alternatives" (p. 91, see 
also pp. 86 and 92). 
Thus, Salkever's essay provides neither an argu- 
ment for a particular political philosophy nor 
grounds in support of the largely implicit claim 
that the concept of "virtue" is as good as or su- 
perior to "obligation" as a defining concept for 
politics. At the conclusion of Salkever's discussion 
the reader is confronted with the following odd 
remark: " . . . I have made no effort in this dis- 
cussion to deal with the epistemological, logical 
and moral issues which are involved in the ques- 
tion of the justifiability of the paradigm change 
[from 'virtue' to 'obligation']" (p. 92). 
What has Salkever done for us? He has pro- 
posed an admittedly undefended definition of poli- 
tics complete with historical lineage as an alterna- 
tive to the one he claims is widely accepted today. 
In addition he adds the trivializing claim that 
"political philosophy can be formulated" (p. 85, 
emphasis added) according to the prescribed al- 
ternative. Now what are we to do? Salkever is 
revealingly silent and terminates his essay before 
he even raises, much less attempts to illuminate, 
the essential problem: which concept-"virtue" or 
"obligation"-should we accept, and for what 
reasons should we accept it? In "Virtue, Obliga- 
tion and Politics" Salkever presents the prelimi- 
naries without the main bout. After all, the pre- 
liminaries are supposed to lead to the main at- 
traction (the problem of justification) which is 
their raison d'etre. 
A political theorist who proposes the accep- 
tance of a particular conception of politics is re- 
sponsible for the defense of this prescription and 
its preferability to competing conceptions. Sal- 
kever admits he does not do this and thereby 
weakens his claim for our attention. Such defini- 
tional exercises as Salkever's (and many more I 
could cite) have obvious consequences. Political 
philosophers and political scientists are faced with 
an overwhelming and confusing array of subject 
matter or field-defining concepts, exacerbated 
only by the proposal of still more concepts 
claimed to be "better." These linguistic proposals 
stand alone and apart from the necessary discus- 
sion and defense of the relationship between con- 
ceptual analysis and the main tasks of normative 
political philosophy, and empirical political sci- 
ence: justification and explanation, respectively. 
To argue merely that politics can be formulated 
according to this or that concept is of little im- 
portance. We must first achieve the'crucial episte- 
mological aims of justification and explanation 
for normative and empirical political discourse. 
Contrary to Salkever's limited classificatory aim, 
we must give greater care and thoughtfulness to 
the very logico-epistemological issues he chooses 
to omit (see his quote above). The conceptual 
clarification thus achieved will indeed aid in the 
making of better political judgments. 
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This point about carrying the conceptual analy- 
sis and linguistic prescription far enough to be 
significant for political inquiry holds for both 
empirical and normative political theorizing. In 
empirical research the proposal of a particular 
conceptual framework or schema is not by itself 
an instance of genuine theorizing, but only 
"taxonornizing," "classifying," or "typologizing" 
in the words of one author (A. James Gregor, An 
Introduction to Metapolitics [New York: The Free 
Press, 1971], p. 171). The proposed framework is 
useful toward and used to achieve the distinctive 
aims of empirical discourse: to make and test the 
claims of description and explanation. Thus, the 
proposal of a conceptual framework is distin- 
guished from the actual empirical assignments 
made according to it (see Israel Scheffler, Science 
and Subjectivity [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1967], pp. 36-44). 
Only the actual assignments are empirically 
tested. Then and only then can the preferability of 
a proposed conceptual recommendation be judged 
rationally according to how it improves the for- 
mulation of empirical claims. In short, the pro- 
posal of classificatory schemata per se without 
claims of explanation and their tests are literally 
undeterminable and of no actual (as opposed to 
potential) use to the empirical political scientist. 
This crucial empirical process of concept forma- 
tion and assignment is instructive for normative 
political inquiry. The mere prescription of a par- 
ticular concept such as Salkever's discussion of 
"virtue" is inadequate without reasoned defense 
of the following: Why should we accept the pre- 
scribed concept, and more importantly, precisely 
how will this concept help us realize the aim of 
normative political discourse, i.e., to make and 
justify normative political judgments? So many 
linguistic recommendations for various concepts 
go unused because they are undefended and lack 
adequate grounds for acceptance. To stop at 
classificatory conceptual analysis and omit this 
required discussion as Salkever does is to termi- 
nate the discussion of political philosophy just 
where it begins to achieve its point, and is typical 
of what is wrong with much of contemporary 
political theorizing: preoccupation with the con- 
ceptual preliminaries without ever going on to the 
main bout of the justification. 
I regret to conclude that Salkever's essay makes 
promises or claims with little or no attempt to 
fulfill or support them. This occurs because their 
author is preoccupied with conceptual prelimi- 
naries which are only of instrumental value. 
Works like "Virtue, Obligation, and Politics" 
lend support to the stereotypical view held by 
political scientists that contemporary philosophy, 
including, of course, political philosophy, consists 
of nothing more than inconsequential word 
games. 
JOEL KASSIOLA 
Brooklyn College, City University of New York 
TO THE EDITOR: 
I understand Mr. Kassiola to be making the 
following argument: 
(1) Salkever is supposed to be doing political 
philosophy. 
(2) Political philosophy is concerned with the 
formulation and justification of normative judg- 
ments, and not with the clarification and classifica- 
tion of normative concepts. 
(3) Conceptual clarification is not even useful 
for justification unless it can show us how to test 
the validity of normative (evaluative or justifica- 
tory) claims, just as a scientific taxonomy is use- 
less unless it can be related to a way of testing 
descriptive and explanatory claims. 
(4) Therefore, contrary to his self-understand- 
ing, Salkever is neither doing, nor helping anyone 
else to do, political philosophy. 
I respond: 
(1) I do not claim to be doing political philos- 
ophy. In my paper I am trying only to show what 
political philosophy does, and some of the ways 
in which it does it. I find it difficult to blame my- 
self for the excessive modesty of this attempt, 
whatever its other shortcomings may be. 
(2) Political philosophy is concerned with justi- 
fication in a way that my paper is not, and of 
course justification is more important than clarifi- 
cation. Unfortunately, however, what is first by 
nature is not always first for us, a fact which seems 
to me to be too little known. I value a good clarifi- 
cation much more highly than a poor justification, 
at least partly because we do not suffer from a 
shortage of justifications. 
(3) "Virtue, Obligation, and Politics" is neither 
an attempt to present an abstract taxonomy nor 
an attempt to establish one mode of evaluation as 
uniquely entitled to our esteem. What I tried to do 
was to say what the meaning of two modes of 
evaluation is, both in terms of the epistemological 
and ontological (or psychological) foundations of 
those modes, and in terms of their powers of 
making moral and political discriminations. It is 
difficult to see how the attempt to clarify in this 
sense could be identified with the activity of pre- 
scriptive taxonomizing. Perhaps the simplest way 
of putting-the difference would be to say that my 
intention was reflective and interpretive rather 
then creative. 
(4) Justification cannot be understood, much 
less written, without a thoughtful consideration of 
the terms involved and the questions asked. While 
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it might well be argued that the scientific project 
can proceed very well without such introspection, 
I would say that political philosophy and its 
study can not. The problem is that we know too 
much; we need no one to tell us how "to make 
and justify normative political judgments." What 
we need is not assistance in formulating new 
judgments, but reflection about the significance of 
the ones we inevitably make. 
STEPHEN SALKEVER 
Bryn Mawr College 
To THE EDITOR: 
It is a pleasure to be associated with Walter 
Dean Burnham, even if we must share the honor 
of criticism by Philip Converse (September, 1974). 
In my own defense, let me plead that I do read 
The American Voter, with the reverence appropri- 
ate to a revered text. I seek to avoid following the 
graven images of straw men, attempt to reconcile 
disparities in the received wisdom, and fear for 
my correlations when they transgress the laws of 
SRC. Nevertheless, like most sacred texts, The 
American Voter did adopt a tone of proclaiming 
general, not time-specific truths. Its emphasis on 
the inherent limitations of the mass public, in- 
deed, largely precludes the possibility of a differ- 
ent paradigm of electoral behavior. 
The data for The American Voter were gathered 
almost two decades ago. That this work is still 
worth reading is testament to its original quality, 
but its authors need not insist on its character as 
holy writ. An earlier American intellectual, 
Thomas Jefferson, suggested political revolution 
every twenty years. Surely innovation in political 
science can be permitted with no lesser frequency. 
GERALD M. POMPER 
Rutgers University 
TO THE EDITOR: 
Robert Forster's review (APSR, 68 [June, 
1974], 811-12) of my book, Provincial Magistrates 
and Revolutionary Politics in France, 1789-1795, 
includes six points on which I want to comment. 
(1) "He observes 'the absence of a written cahier 
does not prove that concern and awareness were 
lacking' (p. 151). But then, what does it prove? 
This is the kind of interpretive acrobatics that 
Dawson is frequently tempted to perform. .." 
Absence of a written cahier might indicate that, 
as a tactic, preparation of such a document 
seemed less promising than some more informal 
means of influencing local political processes; or, 
since not every fact proves a significant conclusion 
and since historians ought to avoid interpretive 
acrobatics, the absence of a written cahier might 
indicate nothing in particular. 
(2) "Is roll-call analysis not feasible for the 
magistrates as deputies?" 
As I said in my book, the National Assembly 
majority "rejected the idea of publishing or even 
preserving lists showing how individuals voted in 
each roll-call vote" (p. 194, with a footnote giving 
the date of this decision, 9 July 1789). 
(3) "It is again unfortunate that the chapter on 
the 'magistrates as deputies' is based on the letters 
(475 of them, to be sure) of only two magistrates 
from the old province of Maine." 
The chapter is also based on 105 letters from a 
magistrate from Lorraine and a total of 117 
letters from five magistrates from various prov- 
inces and the journal entries of two other magis- 
trates from Poitou (p. 196, footnotes). 
(4) "I remain unconvinced that these magis- 
trates were bound by likemindedness in political 
matters, . . . " 
Good. As I said (p. 325), "There were a few 
active opponents of constitutional monarchy, 
some of whom fought in royalist armies against 
the republic . .. Finally, a very small number of 
former bailliage magistrates were uncompromis- 
ing, revolutionary republicans." 
(5) " . . . and [unconvinced] that regional vari- 
ation did not play the role it apparently did 
among advocates." 
Good. As I said (p. 254), "Former magistrates 
were politically strong in a few places, . . . and 
notably weak in others . . . " and (p. 309) "The 
smaller the town, the greater the likelihood that a 
former bailliage magistrate might continue as an 
influential personage or even occupy office" and 
(p. 313) "An exceptional concatenation of cir- 
cumstances could, however, send to the guillotine 
a substantial proportion of the former magis- 
trates of a particular locality." 
(6) Among "a host of a broad sociological hy- 
potheses" seemingly to be found in my book is 
one "about noble vs. commoner." 
This characterization comes strangely from a 
historian who has (convincingly) argued that 
"whoever won the Revolution, the noble land- 
lord lost."* At all events, that more than 80 per 
cent of the members of the parlements were 
noblemen is not a hypothesis but a fact; and that 
about 90 per cent of the bailliage magistrates were 
commoners is likewise a fact. That the parlements 
and the bailliages, in their great majority, were on 
opposite sides of the political fence in 1789 is also 
a fact. Causal inferences are always hypothetical, 
or else false; on this, I suppose, we agree. 
PHILIP DAWSON 
Brooklyn College, City University of New York 
* Past and Present, no. 37 (July, 1967), p. 86. 
